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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal implicates a district court’s discretion to 
manage its docket. Well after the deadline the District Court 
set in a scheduling order, Plaintiff Premier Comp Solutions, 
LLC, moved to amend its complaint and add a party. In 
support, Premier cited the liberal standard of Rule 15 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court denied the motion, 
reasoning that because the deadline had passed, Rule 16(b)(4) 
required Premier to show good cause. Premier appeals the 
Court’s order denying its motion. We will affirm because Rule 
16(b)(4) applies once a scheduling-order deadline has passed, 
and Premier did not show good cause. 
I 
 Premier sued UPMC WorkPartners and MCMC LLC, 
alleging federal antitrust and state unfair competition claims. 
The District Court issued a Case Management Order (CMO) 
on February 22, 2016, stating that “[t]he parties shall move to 
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amend the pleadings or add new parties by June 22, 2016.” 
App. 246. On the day of the deadline, Premier requested an 
extension. The Court agreed and set a new deadline for thirty 
days after UPMC responded to Premier’s discovery requests. 
Because UPMC finished responding to those requests on 
October 14, 2016, the new deadline became November 13, 
2016.  
 November 13 passed without Premier requesting 
another extension. Months later, on March 7, 2017, Premier 
deposed a UPMC employee who, according to Premier, 
testified to facts suggesting UPMC and York Risk 
Management Group had entered into an illegal bid-rigging 
agreement. It moved to file a second amended complaint 
asserting a new antitrust count and adding York as a defendant. 
In its brief, Premier asked the District Court to apply Rule 15(a) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that 
courts should “freely give[] [leave to amend] when justice so 
requires.” App. 563. Premier did not mention Rule 16(b)(4), 
which says a CMO “may be modified only for good cause and 
with the judge’s consent.”  
 UPMC countered that Premier’s motion “relie[d] on the 
wrong rule” and failed to show diligence, App. 630–31, which 
we have recognized as relevant to a district court’s 
determination of “good cause” under Rule 16(b)(4), see, e.g., 
Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 
84–85 (3d Cir. 2010) (deciding a district court “properly denied 
leave to amend” after plaintiff moved to amend after the CMO 
deadline and failed to show “due diligence”). In reply, Premier 
conceded that Rule 16(b)(4) applied and argued for the first 
time that it had been diligent. Premier did not dispute that 
diligence was relevant to the Court’s good-cause determination 
under Rule 16(b)(4). 
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 The District Court denied Premier’s motion. It noted 
Premier failed “to even discuss due diligence, relying instead 
on Rule 15(a).” App. 3. Thus, Premier “utterly fail[ed] to 
establish good cause” under Rule 16(b)(4). Id. Premier moved 
for reconsideration, arguing that while it “initially rel[ied] 
solely on the liberal leave to amend standard of Rule 15(a),” its 
“subsequent reply briefs . . . discuss the Rule 16(b)(4) ‘good 
cause’ standard and [Premier’s] due diligence in depth.” App. 
1185. The Court denied reconsideration. It explained it would 
not consider “issues raised by [Premier] for the first time in its 
reply brief.” App. 1266. UPMC and MCMC later moved for 
summary judgment, which the Court granted. Premier appeals 
the Court’s order denying its motion to amend.  
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. We review for abuse of discretion the order denying 
Premier’s motion to amend. Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 84. 
 Before addressing Premier’s arguments on appeal, we 
take this opportunity to clarify that when a party moves to 
amend or add a party after the deadline in a district court’s 
scheduling order has passed, the “good cause” standard of Rule 
16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies. A 
party must meet this standard before a district court considers 
whether the party also meets Rule 15(a)’s more liberal 
standard.1 
 
 1 This interpretation is consistent with all of our sister 
circuits that have addressed the issue. See Gorsuch, Ltd., B.C. 
v. Wells Fargo Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 771 F.3d 1230, 1241 (10th 
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 Premier makes two arguments on appeal: (1) Rule 
16(b)(4)’s “good cause” standard does not require a party to 
show diligence; and (2) if such a showing is required, its reply 
brief sufficed. Neither argument supports reversal of the 
District Court’s order. 
 Premier failed to present the first argument to the 
District Court and so forfeited it on appeal. App. 814–35, 
1185–89, 1258–65; see In Re: J & S Props., LLC, 872 F.3d 
138, 146 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Joseph, 730 
F.3d 336, 341–42 (3d Cir. 2013)) (explaining arguments not 
raised in the district court are forfeited on appeal). Regardless, 
we have repeatedly recognized—and we reaffirm today—that 
whether “good cause” exists under Rule 16(b)(4) depends in 
part on a plaintiff’s diligence. See Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 84–
85; Eastern Minerals & Chemicals Co. v. Mahan, 225 F.3d 
330, 340 (3d Cir. 2000). 
As for Premier’s second argument, the Court did not 
abuse its discretion in ignoring Premier’s attempt to address 
Rule 16(b)(4)’s “good cause” standard. In its motion, Premier 
relied solely on Rule 15(a); it did not address Rule 16(b)(4) 
 
Cir. 2014); Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 719 (7th 
Cir. 2011); Nourison Rug Corp. v. Parvizian, 535 F.3d 295, 298 
(4th Cir. 2008); O’Connell v. Hyatt Hotels of Puerto Rico, 357 
F.3d 152, 154–55 (1st Cir. 2004); Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 
888, 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2003); S&W Enters., LLC v. SouthTrust 
Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533, 535–36 (5th Cir. 2003); Parker 
v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 340 (2d Cir. 2000); 
In re Milk Prods. Antitrust Litig., 195 F.3d 430, 437 (8th Cir. 
1999); Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1419 (11th 
Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 
Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607–08 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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except in reply to UPMC. So the District Court was entitled to 
find Premier forfeited its argument under Rule 16(b)(4). See, 
e.g., Narducci v. Moore, 572 F.3d 313, 324 (7th Cir. 2009); cf. 
Venuto v. Carella, Byrne, Bain, Gilfillan, Cecchi & Stewart, 
P.C., 11 F.3d 385, 388 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The district court 
properly exercised its discretion and refused to consider 
contentions first addressed in [a] sur reply memorandum.”) 
(citation omitted).  
* * * 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order denying Premier’s motion to amend and add a 
new party. 
